TTG Plus > FAQs


FAQ 25 • Convincing the viewer

Why does TTG say viewers have to “convinced”?

  • 2501. What ways do TTG photographers have of convincing viewers that a photo qualifies for the TTG label?

    That is covered on this viewpoint page.

  • 2502. Will there ever be a way for the typical photographer to prove beyond all doubt to everyone that a photograph is qualified for the TTG label?

    No, there never will be a way to prove that — at least, not “beyond all doubt” and not to “everyone.”

    There are too many variables that can never be definitively confirmed to every viewer’s satisfaction, with respect to both the seen aspects of photographs (the “appearance,” which P7 addresses) and with respect to the unseen aspects of photographs (the “circumstances,” which P8 addresses).

  • 2503. Could “content authentication” technology be used to prove that a photo is undoctored?

    Yes. Comparing a TTG-labeled photo to the unaltered original version of that same photo would reveal whether the photograph meets TTG’s definition of “undoctored”—

    — and the EXIF data of the original could help confirm several other requirements of the Trust Test as well.

  • 2504. And the “before” version of those “before vs. after” comparisons is what TTG calls a VUO?

    Yes, it is called a VUO* when the original version is digitally “encrypted” at the time of recording — that is, a unique “code number” is assigned to that image — in a way that can be used to prove that it is truly unaltered.
    _______________________

    *“VUO” (verifiably unaltered original) is TTG’s term for an encrypted unaltered original.

    “CUO” (confirmed unaltered original) is TTG’s term for the VUO that has been verified as being unaltered.

    Both of these terms were created by TTG in 2020 in anticipation of future technologies. If a different term comes into universal use that covers all parties’ use the technology, TTG’s references will be changed accordingly. (See also the note at the bottom of this page.)

  • 2505. What’s the difference between a VUO and a CUO?

    • The Verifiably Unaltered Original and the Confirmed Unaltered Original are one and the same file, identical in appearance.

    • The only difference is the non-verified status of the VUO vs. the confirmed status of the CUO.

    • There is no way to have a CUO for any image unless it was recorded as a VUO.

    • VUOs could become common — produced in the millions — but there’s no need for them to evolve into CUOs except when “proof” is needed about what was done to a photograph.

    • That means that a photographer could theoretically record thousands of VUOs with only one (or none) of them going through the verification process to become a CUO.

  • 2506. How would the comparison be made between the Confirmed Unaltered Original and the final, TTG-labeled photo?

    It would be a visual comparison, using TTG’s Allowable Changes list coupled with the Trust Test, to confirm that no disqualifying changes were made to the photo.

    It would be easy in any photo-editing program to make a layer of the CUO “before” picture and a layer of the TTG-labeled “after” picture and then click either layer on or off to see what was changed.

  • 2507. What’s to keep a photographer from submitting a Verifiably Unaltered Original that is actually a rephotograph of a doctored photo?

    The VUO would have embedded in it the focus data, location data, the time data, and the device data.

    That data in most cases would reveal whether it was a photograph of another photograph.

  • 2508. What will it take for the VUO process to be widely accepted?

    Once “trust” considerations are definitively resolved (“Is the encryption process truly unhackable?”), to gain widespread acceptance the procedures for both encrypting and for verifying will have to be both user-friendly and inexpensive (or free).

  • 2509. What about the technologies that reveal exactly what changes were made to a photograph after it was encrypted at the time of recording?

    Those technologies can be helpful for some photo publishers, but that information isn’t necessary for TTG purposes.

    All that’s needed for TTG purposes is a “before” photo that can be verified as being unaltered and contains the exposure data noted in #2507 above.

    A simple visual comparison of that unaltered original with the TTG-labeled photo would reveal whether the photo meets TTG’s definition of “undoctored.”

  • 2510. And neither the “Verifiably Unaltered Original” nor the “Confirmed Unaltered Original” would be created to be put before viewers?

    That is correct.

    Since even minimal cropping or downsizing – both of which are routine even in news photography – could keep a VUO from being confirmable as a CUO, it would be unrealistic in most contexts to expect the VUO or CUO version of a photograph to be put before viewers.

    (The CUO is the same image as the VUO and thus the two look identical. The only difference is that the CUO is a confirmation that the VUO’s encryption is intact.)

  • 2511. But a version of the VUO/CUO (“before”) photo could be published alongside the TTG-labeled (“after”) version to help resolve a controversy?

    Yes, after taking precautions against image theft, a version of the VUO/CUO could be put before viewers if needed to resolve a controversy...

    . . . the way photo-contest sponsors sometimes publish a copy of the unaltered original file to explain why they disqualified as “doctored” a particular photo submitted to the contest.

  • 2512. How is “unaltered original” defined?

    For standalone cameras, what constitutes the “unaltered original” of a single-exposure photograph might be akin to a typical raw-format image.

    But it may be harder to reach an industry consensus on what constitutes an “unaltered original” for smartphones. Unaltered originals of individual exposures on smartphones can be fairly unimpressive before they are combined with other exposures and extensively massaged—

    —that is, they would be unflattering to the smartphone maker.

  • 2513. Photojournalists can already buy cameras with authentication technology. Isn’t that enough?

    The issue is that more and more spot-news photographs are being supplied to news organizations by ordinary citizens with a smartphone — not by photojournalists using a high-end standalone camera.

    AI-GC technology is making it ever easier to doctor images instantly on smartphones. Thus it could be argued that to a news provider, it would be more useful to be able to verify the undoctored status of “smartphone photos that were submitted from strangers” than to verify “standalone-camera photos taken by established photojournalists who are known and trusted by the provider.”

  • 2514. Could VUO/CUO technology be built into smartphones?

    Yes. Smartphones may be even better suited for implementation of VUO/CUO technology than interchangeable lens (standalone) cameras are, for two reasons:

    1. Smartphones are more likely than standalone cameras to be connected to the web/cloud, which could help with quickly uploading encrypted VUOs.

    2. Smartphones have “sealed” lenses that cannot be interchanged. Lens/focus data is critical in image verification — especially to prevent rephotographing doctored or aigmented images — but many standalone camera photographers use interchangeable third-party lenses that may not provide reliable focus data.

    (Accessory lenses can be attached to smartphones, but it would be easy for manufacturers to position next to phone lenses a sensor to detect anything within a couple of inches of the lens. Focus-data discrepancies would often also reveal the use of accessory lenses.)

  • 2515. But if unaltered originals can make smartphones look bad (as per #2512 above), why would smartphone manufacturers ever integrate VUO/CUO technology into their devices?

    Because of demand.

    As the world speeds into the age of AI, it may not be long before in many situations the “trustworthiness” of images is as important as the “appearance” of images.

    (Up to now, smartphone manufacturers have been spending billions of dollars a year on “appearance” and virtually nothing on “trustworthiness.”)

    No major smartphone manufacturer is likely to want to be known as the maker of “the phone that takes photos nobody trusts” (a danger with smartphones marketed for their AI-GC-manipulation capabilities).

  • 2516. Couldn’t a smartphone manufacturer who didn’t want to “look bad” doctor their VUOs so that their cameras seem better?

    They could, but because the brand and model of camera will included with the VUO data, viewers and publishers would soon learn not to trust VUOs made by that brand and model.

  • 2517. Will it eventually be possible for anyone to do the verification process and not just newsphoto editors?

    For example, would a photographer who puts a TTG-labeled image on social media be able to say, “Check the CUO and confirm for yourself that this image is undoctored”?

    It’s possible, but there will always be the issue of preventing image theft if the CUO is made available to the wider public.

    There are workarounds to image theft, such as prominent watermarking and/or posting a low-res version of the CUO.

    But those workarounds would obviously compromise the verifying persons’ ability to see a non-watermarked, high-resolution CUO — which is the best comparison option when assessing a high-resolution TTG-labeled photograph.

  • 2518. What are the details of how VUOs and CUOs would actually work if implemented on millions of smartphones?

    VUO/CUO definition

    Would the encryption be a standard feature on new smartphones? • Would it be backwards compatible with existing smartphones? • Would photographers have to install new software to use it? • Who will control the software standard? • Would the encryption/verification process be universal or would it be specific to each brand of smartphone? • Would it cost extra to encrypt, upload, and store VUOs compared to normal photo uploads to storage services? • How much does the encryption add to the file size? • What’s involved in confirming that a VUO’s encryption is intact? • Since verification involves access to a full-sized original photo, who would be trusted to confirm VUOs as being unaltered? • What would be the protection against false positives or false negatives? • Who would be allowed to examine the VUO/CUO?

    Those issues will have to be figured out by companies that bring the VUO/CUO concept to market.

  • 2519. How will VUO/CUO technology relate to TTG?

    Assuming that the technology delivers as promised — that is, providing unhackable proof that a photo is undoctored — then VUOs and CUOs will be of great help to TTG.

    • A note for this FAQ only

  • Because this FAQ includes speculation about a technology that is not yet available on the most popular cameras, unlike with the other FAQs on this website the content and order of multiple questions and answers above will likely change in the future.

    Thus users can make a link to any specific question in the usual way, but they should be aware that (unlike with the other FAQs) the questions and answers in this FAQ (above) may change.